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Abstract 
 
This paper examines factors influencing the voluntary disclosure contained in the 
annual reports and other investor relations’ information of Japanese corporations listed 
on the Mothers and Jasdaq stock market. We examine the relation between the level of 
voluntary disclosure and the size, stock market listing, profitability, ownership 
structure, leverage and industry type. We also examine the relation between the level 
of voluntary disclosure and the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts, and the size of 
the analyst following. A firm’s size, stock market listing, profitability and, analyst 
following are the most important factors explaining voluntary disclosures overall. We 
also find more voluntary disclosures; and market listing, and less managerial 
ownership and analysts following associated with higher forecast accuracy and, that 
sales change is positively related to the accuracy of earnings forecasts. 
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1 Introduction 
Most studies in voluntary disclosure focus on disclosures which are not governed by 
legislation or accounting standards. A more precise name for these disclosures would 
therefore be ‘non-mandatory disclosure’. Nevertheless, to keep in line with common 
usage, in this study the world ‘voluntary’ will generally be used to refer to 
non-mandatory disclosures.  
Voluntary disclosure is important in providing a greater degree of transparency. The 
Asian financial crisis has highlighted the need for information, especially voluntary 
information. In recent years, there have been increasing call for firms to improve their 
corporate governance structure and information disclosure. Shareholder protection is 
increasingly important for Japan to keep its status as a major world financial center. 
Better practices in corporate governance and greater voluntary disclosure are being 
promoted in Japanese corporations, especially after the Asian financial crisis. Several 
features of Japanese culture have been cited in literature as contributing to limited 
disclosure. One issue is the keiretsu ownership structure of Japanese industry. In this 
structure, “insiders” are major sources of financing and are well informed about the 
earnings prospects of keiretsu partners. Thus, disclosures to “outsiders” are not so 
important. 
Mothers and Jasdaq are the focus of this study, because of their unique and similar 
backgrounds as emerging markets for venture corporations with rapidly growing 
capital markets. The total market capitalization of the Jasdaq market has increased 
more than 4.1 times from JPY27410.8 billion to JPY112658 billion during 1999~2004. 
Similarly, it has increased more than 4 times from JPY813 billion to JPY3226 billion 
for the Mothers market from 1999.12~2004.12.   
To foster the development of start-up firms, the Tokyo Stock Exchange established a 
new market named Mothers (“market of the high-growth and emerging stocks”) on 
November 11, 1999, in order to provide venture companies; with access to funds at an 
early stage of their development and to provide investors with more diversified 
investment products. The main listing criterion 1  is the prospect of a company's 
business area. While there are no criteria for profit, listed companies are required to 
disclose business results every quarter and an initial public offering must involve a 
minimum of 1,000 trading units of newly issued shares. 
                                                  
1 Listing Requirements of Mothers: a, Eligibility: potentials for high growth; b, 
Liquidity: Public Offering of minimum 1,000 trading units of new issued shares, 
minimum 300 new shareholders, at least JPY 1000 million on the day of listing; c, 
Sales record; d, Financial Statements; e, Shareholder service representative agent; f, 
Restrictions on Transfer of Shares. 
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Jasdaq（Japan Securities Dealers Association automated Quotation）started in1963, 
and now is the largest market for start-up firms in Asia. Unlike the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, the Jasdaq exchange doesn't require companies to have profitability2.  
Both the Mothers and Jasdaq stock market are mainly for start-up corporations, and 
both two stock market play important roles in fostering new industries in Japan. 
Voluntary disclosure will increase the firm’s transparency; in order to attract and 
retain investors. However, there are many problems concerning information disclosure 
in both markets. Widespread bending of accounting rules and information disclosure at 
a number of venture companies has been revealed. TSE (Tokyo Stock Exchange) found 
the Software Company ASSOCIATE TECHNOLOGY made a window dressing 
settlement (2004.10.21.Nikkei Economic Newspaper). On the other hand, as far as we 
know, few studies have directly or indirectly focused on the voluntary disclosure 
practices of Japanese start-up firms. For all these reasons, not only is more research 
needed on the two markets, but also an assessment of similarities and differences in 
voluntary disclosure is likely to give insight. 
Accordingly, this paper examines the relationship between voluntary disclosure level 
and the proxies of corporations. We also examine the relation between voluntary 
disclosure level and the properties of analysts’ earning forecasts and size of analyst 
followings for a sample of firms. Chen and Jaggi (2000) examine the association 
between independent non-executive directors and the comprehensiveness of 
information in financial disclosures.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior literature on corporate 
disclosures, and explains the Variables of Interest. Section 3 presents the hypotheses. 
Section 4 discusses the sample and the methodology used in this study. The results are 
contained in Section 5. The paper concludes with a summary in Section 6. 
 
2 Literature Review and Variables of Interest 
 
2.1 Variables of Interest 
The empirical and theoretical literature suggests a number of variables that may 
explain voluntary disclosures. We discuss the variables in this section, while section 4 
                                                  
2 Listing Requirements of Jasdaq: Profitability: Profit of current term was positive 
value or Ordinary profit minimum 500 million (market capitalization over 5000 million 
doesn’t require); b, Asset minimum JPY 200 million; c, Shareholder: minimum 300 new 
shareholders d, Financial Statements; e, Shareholder service representative agent; f, 
Restrictions on Transfer of Shares. 
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defines how each variable is measured 
 
Size 
There are many reasons why larger companies might disclose more information than 
other corporations, and some of these relate to the need to raise capital at a lower cost. 
Larger companies are likely to need substantial capital and corporations may increase 
disclosure to facilitate this equity and debt issuance. 
Larger corporations tend to be more complex since they are likely to be multi-product 
based and operate in a number of geographical areas. Such complexity requires more 
information disclosure. 
Furthermore, larger firms are likely to be entities of economic significance, so that 
there may be greater demands for information from customers, suppliers, analysts, and 
governments as well as the general public. In general, larger firms disclose more 
information than smaller ones. All of these issues indicate that larger firms should 
have additional incentives for voluntary disclosure compared to smaller firms.  
 
Industry 
It is plausible that disclosure in corporate reports may not be identical throughout all 
sectors of the economy. For example, because of the nature of their products and their 
research and development, chemical companies are likely to be more sensitive about 
disclosures to competitors and the public than companies in certain other industries. 
The relevance of the items selected for disclosures can also vary across industries. 
Research and Development is more relevant for companies in high tech industries, for 
example. Therefore, industry membership may exert an influence on voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
Internationality 
As firms become multinational, they face additional demands from foreign investors. 
The increased internationalization of operations results in a larger proportion of 
foreign stakeholders in the corporation. Thus, the demand for information is expected 
to increase, resulting in an increased level of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Profitability 
In general, profitable, well-run firms have incentives to distinguish themselves from 
less profitable ones in order to raise capital on the best available terms. Thus, more 
profitable firms are expected to disclose more voluntary information. 
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Listing Status 
In order to raise capital through the markets, it is possible that listed companies will 
voluntarily disclose additional information. Monitoring also varies with listing status, 
and stronger enforcement will increase the level of voluntary disclosure. Mothers has 
more generous enforcement. Jasdaq-listed corporations may disclose more information 
than those listed on Mothers stock market. 
 
Ownership structure 
In addition to relevant accounting standards and practices for disclosure of voluntary 
information, the management’s attitude towards disclosures also plays an important 
role in such disclosure. 
Ownership structure is characterized by managerial ownership, block-holder 
ownership and outside-director ownership. 
Patton and Baker (1987) assert that inside directors are not effective at monitoring 
management since most of them have benefited from top management.  
Outside directors are more aggressive in monitoring for the following reasons. First, 
outside directors regard financial performance as a key element in monitoring 
management. Second, compared to insider directors, outside directors are more positive 
in dismissing chief executive officers when the corporate performance is not 
satisfactory. Third, outside directors are positive in monitoring management to 
maintain their reputations. Thus, we expect that non-executive directors on corporate 
boards will enhance the level of voluntary disclosure, and ensure the accuracy of the 
information that management provides.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
T. Rhanna, K.G. Palepu, and S.Srinivasan (2004) find that firm size; and performance 
are positively associated with the level of disclosure. 
Meek, and Gray (1995) examine disclosures in the annual reports of multinational 
corporations from the United States, the United Kingdom and Continental Europe. 
They find that firm size, country, listing status and industry are all important factors 
in explaining voluntary disclosures. 
L.L.Eng, and Mak (2003) find that lower managerial ownership and significant 
government ownership are associated with increased disclosure. 
T.E.Cooke (1991) finds that the firm’s size, stock market listing, and industry type are 
significant predictors in empirical research about Japanese corporations. 
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Li Li Eng and Hong Kiat Teo (1999, 2000) show that the level of corporate disclosure is 
positively related to the accuracy of earnings forecasts by analyst; they also show that 
disclosure is negatively related to dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
Leung and Horwitz (2004) find that high board ownership explains the extent of low 
voluntary disclosure and that this relationship is stronger when firm performance is 
very poor; and they also find that the contribution of non-executive directors to 
enhancing voluntary disclosure is effective for firms with low director ownership in 
Hong Kong corporations. 
Mark M. Spiegel and Nobuyoshi Yamori (2003) find that more leveraged, and smaller 
banks with less competitive pressure were less likely to voluntarily disclose. 
Chen, and Jaggi (2000) show that the ratio of non-executive directors to the total 
number of directors on corporate boards is positively associated with the 
comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. 
Hope (2003) investigates the relations between the accuracy of analysts’ ‘earning 
forecasts and the level of annual report disclosure, and between forecast accuracy and 
the degree of enforcement of accounting standards. He finds that firm-level disclosures 
are positively related to forecast accuracy, and also finds that strong enforcement is 
associated with higher forecast accuracy. 
 Chau, and Gray (2002), examine the association of ownership structure with the 
voluntary disclosures of listed corporations in Hong Kong and Singapore. They find 
that the extent of outside ownership is positively associated with voluntary disclosures. 
There are a number of studies relating to the disclosure practices of Japanese 
corporations. Most notably, Cooke (1991) examines firm-specific characteristics of 
disclosure among survey samples of Japanese corporations. Conversely, Meek (1999), 
argues that the traditionally low disclosure levels of Japanese corporations are due to 
managers’ perceptions that the costs of additional disclosure are greater than the 
benefits. Satomi (2004) examines the relation between the level of voluntary disclosure 
and the cost of equity capital among Japanese firms. He finds that it was negative 
relations between the level of voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity capital. 
  
3 Hypotheses 
3.1 
3.1.1 Hypothesis 1 
Large firms are likely to make more voluntary disclosures because of the greater 
demand for outside capital, lower average costs of collecting and disseminating 
information, and greater demand for information by financial analysts. Firms with 
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high leverages incur higher monitoring costs. Thus, the managers of high debt firms 
seek to reduce these costs by disclosing more information in annual reports (Ahmed 
and Courtis, 1999). Firms with high profitability might have incentives to make more 
corporate disclosures in order to communicate their good performance to investor. And 
high growth firms might have higher information asymmetry between managers and 
investors and thus have incentives to reduce this information gap by more voluntary 
disclosure. Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: The level of voluntary disclosure is associated with the firm’s size, profitability, 
and leverage. 
 
3.1.2 Hypothesis 2 
Listing status is an important variable in prior empirical researches. Firms listed on 
Jasdaq might make more disclosures than firms listed on Mothers. The majority of 
firms listed on Jasdaq have a high reputation for the quality and comprehensiveness of 
their listing requirements including more strict accounting and disclosure obligations. 
Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The level of voluntary disclosure in the Mothers stock market is lower than in the 
Jasdaq stock market. 
 
3.2 
3.2.1 Hypothesis 3 
Manager-owners are initially endowed with information on the value of their firm. This 
information is a particular, clearly circumscribed item of information concerning the 
future cash flows of the firm. In the simplest case, the manager-owners would know the 
amount of future cash flows with certainty, and would therefore know the value of the 
firm. The manager-owners can decide whether or not to disclose to investors. 
Managerial ownership is the percentages of ordinary shares held by the CEO and 
executive directors, and includes their deemed interests. When managerial ownership 
is low, there is a greater agency problem. That is, the manager has greater incentives 
to consume perks and reduced incentives to maximize the company’s performance. 
Hence, outside shareholders will increase monitoring of the manager’s behavior to 
reduce the agency costs. Monitoring by outside shareholders increases the costs of the 
firm. However, monitoring by outside shareholders may be reduced if managers can 
provide voluntary disclosure. That is, voluntary disclosure is a substitute for 
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monitoring. Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with managerial 
ownership. 
 
3.2.2 Hypothesis 4 
Block-holder ownership is the percentage of ordinary shares held by substantial 
shareholders (that is, shareholdings of 5% or more). When block-holder ownership is 
low there is an increased need for monitoring. Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with block-holder 
ownership. 
 
3.2.3 Hypothesis 5 
Outside directors who are less aligned to management may be more inclined to 
encourage firms to disclose more information to outside investors. That is, a positive 
relation between the proportion of outside directors and voluntary disclosure is 
expected. Chen and Jaggi (2000) find empirical evidence of a positive relation between 
the proportion of independent directors and disclosure. Hence, we hypothesize that the 
proportion of outside directors is positively associated with the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with outside-director 
ownership. 
 
3.3 
3.3.1 Hypothesis 6 
Analysts generally depend on the information disclosed by firms to forecast their next 
period’s earnings. As such, the extent of disclosure is expected to have a positive effect 
on the accuracy of the analysts’ earnings forecast. We expect a positive relation 
between the level of corporate disclosure and the accuracy of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: The accuracy of analysts’ earning forecasts is positively associated with the level of 
voluntary disclosure  
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3.3.2 Hypothesis 7 
The dispersion among analysts’ earnings forecasts refers to the difference between the 
earnings forecasts provided by different analysts.  
 
Lang (1996) notes that this dispersion exists primarily for two reasons. First, the 
dispersion might exist because of differences in information. Each analyst has access to 
different private information. This causes the dispersion in their forecasts. Second, it 
could be due to differences in forecasting models. Even if the information available to 
each analyst is the same, individual analysts might have a unique forecasting model. 
This difference in forecasting models contributes to the dispersion among their 
forecasts. If analysts have asymmetric information, then an increase in the level of 
information disclosure should reduce the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. On 
the other hand, if the dispersion is due mainly to a difference in forecasting models, 
then an increase in the level of information disclosure may increase the dispersion 
among analysts’ earnings forecasts. This is because more information is input into their 
different forecasting models, resulting in larger dispersions among their earnings 
forecasts. Since the relation between disclosure and the dispersion in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts is unclear, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H7: The level of voluntary disclosure is associated with the dispersion in analyst’s 
earnings forecasts 
 
3.3.3 Hypothesis 8 
Disclosures provided in annual reports and other resources represent a part of a firm’s 
overall information environment. One proxy for a firm’s information environment is its 
analyst following. I expect the importance of voluntary disclosures is positively related 
to the number of analysts who follow the firm. Li.Li.Eng and Hong Kiat Teo (1999) 
state that a higher level of disclosure leads to more analysts following the firms. 
However, the demand for analyst services will depend on the role that analysts play in 
the capital markets. If analysts act mainly as information intermediaries, an increase 
in firm-provided information means that analysts have more input to process and 
therefore a more valuable report to sell. However, if analysts act mainly as information 
providers competing with information released by the firm, then an increase in 
corporate disclosure will substitute for the analysts’ service. Then an increase in the 
level of corporate disclosure will reduce the demand for analyst’s services. Since the 
relation between disclosure and analyst following is unclear, we test the following 
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hypothesis: 
 
H8: The level of voluntary disclosure is associated with the size of the analyst 
following. 
 
4 Sample and Data 
4.1 Voluntary Disclosures 
Because there has been no empirical research about disclosure in corporations listed on 
Mothers and Jasdaq stock market, there is not a voluntary disclosure checklist that 
can be used. For the purpose of this study, the checklist is based on Eng (2003), Hong 
(1997), and Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995). The checklist contains three main 
categories: strategic information, non-financial information and financial information. 
One reason to divide the information into three types is that the decision relevance of 
information probably varies with type. For example, the strategic and financial 
information categories have obvious decision relevance for investors. The nonfinancial 
information category is directed more toward the company’s social accountability. 
In order to carry out the study, the 2003 annual reports were obtained for the sample 
firms. At the time of data collection, these were the latest annual reports available. In 
the Investor Relations information we took the latest information from each firm 
homepage. The contents of voluntary disclosure were compared to the items on the 
checklist and coded as 1 or 0 (or not applicable), depending upon whether the 
information contained or did not contain the disclosure item.  
The voluntary disclosure score for each firm is additive and unweighted. Unweighted 
scores are used for several reasons. First is the subjectivity that would be involved in 
assigning weights when user preferences are unknown and when users in different 
stock markets are likely to assign different weights to similar items. Unweighted 
scores have been used in most empirical studies. Furthermore, Chow (1987) finds 
almost identical results using weighted and unweighted disclosure scores.  
  
4.2 Variables 
We describe how the variables are measured. (a) Firm Size was measured by the firm’s 
assets and sales, taken from the SIKIHO (Japan Company Handbook). (b) Listing 
Status was indicated using 0, 1 dummy variables to classify corporations into Mother 
and Jasdaq. We defined Jasdaq as 1, and Mothers as 0 in this study. (c) Profitability 
was measured as the firm’s ROE (Return on Equity) and ROA (Return on Assets). 
Using the data from the SIKIHO (Japan Company Handbook). (d) Industry Type 
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measured as 0, 1 dummy variables. We divided the total firms into four groups: (1) IT, 
(2) Service, (3) Electric Machines, and (4) others. (e) Leverage was calculated as the 
firm’s total debt to equity ratio, using the data from the SIKIHO (Japan Company 
Handbook). (f) Ownership Structure was from the SIKIHO (Japan Company 
Handbook), the YAKUINSIKIHO (Japan Company Directors Handbook), and the 
OOKABUNUSISOURAN (Japan Company Block-holders Handbook). (g) Analysts’ 
forecasts of EPS were obtained from the 2003 issue of the I/B/E/S detail file. Actual 
realized EPS was obtained from the 2004 issue of the I/B/E/S detail file. Both forecast 
and actual earnings per share are from the I/B/E/S International Summary Files. The 
firm’s stock price used in the analysis is at the beginning of the 2003 fiscal year. (h) 
Analysts following is measured by the number of analysts that made forecasts for the 
firm in the I/B/E/S detail file.  
In this study, we define two variables, accuracy of the analysts’ earnings forecasts, 
and dispersion of the analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
The accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts3 is defined as the deviation of the 
forecast EPS from the actual EPS. This measure is obtained as follows: 
 
Aj =
-⁄ » FEPS i, j - AEPS j » ên j
p j
where
Aj = Accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts forfirm j;
FEPS i, j = EPS forecast forfirm j by the ith analyst;
AEPS j = Actual EPS forfirm j forthe period;
n j = Numberof analysts making forecasts forfirm j;
p j = Share price of firm jat the beginning fiscal year;  
 
The dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts is defined as the standard deviation of 
forecasts between analysts deflated by the share price. It is obtained as follows: 
SD j =
1
p j
 &'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''
n j  ⁄FEPS i, j2 - H⁄FEPS i, j L2
n jHn j - 1L
where
SD j = Standarddeviation of analysts'earnings forecasts forfirm j;
FEPS i, j = EPS forecast forfirm j by the ith analyst;
n j = Numberof analysts making forecasts forfirm j;
p j = Share price of firm j at the beginning of fiscal year;  
                                                  
3 Lang and Lundholm (1996) take the negative absolute value of the difference 
between the median analyst’s forecast EPS and the actual EPS. Taking the median 
analyst’s forecast EPS ignores the forecasts of other analyst. Since we are examining 
the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts, it is more appropriate to take the mean of all 
analysts’ forecasts. 
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Table A summarizes the definition and measurement of all variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A                 Definition and Measurement of variables
Leverage rat io
Total liabilit y divided b y total
asset s
SIKIHOU(200
4)
f
Managerial owners hip
The proportion of ordinary
shares held by CEO and
executi ve directors
OOKABUNUSI
SOURAN(2 00
4)
g
Blockholder ownership
The proportion of ordinary
shares owned b y subs tantial
shareholders(with equity of 5 %
or more)
OOKABUNUSI
SOURAN(2 00
4)
Shareholders Number of total  s hareholders.
OOKABUNUSI
SOURAN(2 00
4)
Foreigner s hareholders The proportion of ordinary
shares held by foreigner
OOKABUNUSI
SOURAN(2 00
4)
Board composition Percentage of outside executive
directors  on the board
YAKUINSIKI
HOU(2004,20
05)
Board composition Percentage of outside auditors
on the board
YAKUINSIKI
HOU(2004,20
05)
h
Auditor reputat ion
Coded as 1 as audit or is  Big-Four
firm  and 0 otherwise
e
SIKIHOU(200
4)
Stock market list ing
st atus
Coded as 1 if the frm list ed on
Jasdaq  and 0 for lis ted on
Mothers
Tokyo Stock
Exchange
Market and
Jasdaq 's
homepages.
Indust ry type
Coded as 1 if belong t o t he
selected industry group and 0
otherwise.
Tokyo Stock
Exchange
Market and
Jasdaq 's
homepages.
Fi rm si ze
 Measured with ASSET or
SALES over the past  year in
Japanese Yen(milli ons )
SIKIHOU(200
4)
Fi rm growth
Measured with the change about
ASS ET or SALES over the p ast
year.
SIKIHOU(200
4)
Analyst  following
The number of analysts
following the fi rm. IBES
Dispersion of forecas t
The standard deviation of
analysts ' earnings  forecast s for
the firm
IBES
Accuracy of forecast
The negative of t he absolute
difference b etween actual EPS
and analyst s' forecasts  scaled by
stock price
IBES
Fi rm profitbili ty
Measured with ROE(Net income
divided by shareholders equit y),
ROA(Net income divided by
tot al asset).
SIKIHOU(200
4)
Disclosure score
Total number of point s awarded
for  voluntary disclosure of
st ragic, non-financial and
financial informat ion.               
See the Ap pendix
Annual reports
and  the other
inves tor rel ated
informations.
DEB T
MOWN
BLOCK
SHARE
FOR EIGN
OUTMAN
OUTDIR
AUDITOR
LISING
INDUSTRY a
FSIZE b
GROWTH c
ANALYST
FRSD
ACCURACY
PROFITBILITY d
DSCOR E
Definition Measurement Data Source(s )
We divide d the  industry to four groups: 1, IT ; 2, S erivice ; 3, Ele ctric Machines; 4, Others.a. 
We used ASSET or  SALESb. 
We used ASSETCHANGE or  SALES CHA NGEc. 
We used RO E or ROAd. 
Big-Four Auditor: Aoyama, S hinnihon, Azusa, Toma tsu.e. 
JAPAN  COMPAN Y HAND BO OKf. 
JAPAN  CO MPAN Y BLOCK-HO LDERS HA NDBOOKg. 
JAPAN  CO MPAN Y DIRECTORS HANG BO OKh. 
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4.3 Sample firms 
The sample consists of firms listed on Mothers and Jasdaq at the end of 2004. Our 
sample firms were randomly selected from these two stock markets. The sample 
contained 100 firms, 50 from Mothers and the other 50 from Jasdaq. To examine the 
relation between the level of voluntary disclosure and Industry type, we selected 40 
firms in the IT industry (20 firms from Mothers); 20 firms in Service Industries (10 
firms from Mothers); 20 firms in the electric machinery industry (10 firms from 
Mothers); and 20 firms in other industries (10 firms from Mothers).  
 
4.4 Regression model 
H1, H3, H4, H5 test the relation between the level of voluntary disclosure and the firm 
size, profitability, and leverage. We use the following regression models to test last 
hypotheses.  
Model1-1  
DSCORE = b0 + b1  DEBT + b2  MOWN + b3 BLOCK + b4  SHARE
+b5  FOREIGN + b6 OUTMAN + b7 OUTDIR + b8  AUDITOR
+b9  LISTING+ b10 INDUSTRY1 + b11 INDUSTRY2 +
b12 INDUSTRY3 + b13 ASSET + b14 ASSETC + b15 ROE  
 
Model1-2 
DSCORE = b0 + b1  DEBT + b2  MOWN + b3 BLOCK + b4  SHARE
+b5  FOREIGN + b6 OUTMAN + b7 OUTDIR + b8  AUDITOR
+b9  LISTING+ b10 INDUSTRY1 + b11 INDUSTRY2 +
b12 INDUSTRY3 + b13 ASSET + b14 ASSETC + b15 ROA  
 
Model1-3 
DSCORE = b0 + b1  DEBT + b2  MOWN + b3 BLOCK + b4  SHARE
+b5  FOREIGN + b6 OUTMAN + b7 OUTDIR + b8  AUDITOR
+b9  LISTING+ b10 INDUSTRY1 + b11 INDUSTRY2 +
b12 INDUSTRY3 + b13 SALES + b14  SALESC + b15 ROA  
 
Model1-4 
DSCORE = b0 + b1  DEBT + b2  MOWN + b3 BLOCK + b4  SHARE
+b5  FOREIGN + b6 OUTMAN + b7 OUTDIR + b8  AUDITOR
+b9  LISTING+ b10 INDUSTRY1 + b11 INDUSTRY2 +
b12 INDUSTRY3 + b13 SALES + b14  SALESC + b15 ROE  
  where, 
DSCORE= disclosure scores; 
DEBT   = total liabilities divided by total assets; 
MOWN =percentage of equity ownership by CEO and inside directors; 
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BLOCK =percentage of equity ownership by substantial shareholders (with equity of 
5% or more) 
SHARE = number of total shareholders following the firm; 
FOREIGN=percentage of foreign shareholders divided by total shareholders: 
OUTMAN= percentage of outside executive directors on the board; 
OUTDIR =percentage of outside auditors on the board; 
AUDITOR=dummy variable for auditor reputation, coded as 1 for Big-Four Auditor 
Firms and 0 otherwise;  
LISTING=dummy variable for listing status, coded as 1 for Jasdaq and 0 for Mothers; 
INDUSTRY1=dummy variable for industry, coded as 1 for Information Technology 
industry and 0 otherwise; 
INDUSTRY2= dummy variable for industry, coded as 1 for Information Service 
industries and 0 otherwise; 
INDUSTRY3= dummy variable for industry, coded as 1 for Information Electric 
machinery industry and 0 otherwise; 
ASSET= market value of firm; 
ASSETC= measured the change in total assets over the previous year; 
SALES=the firm’s sales over the year;  
SALESC= measured the change in sales over the previous year; 
ROE= return on shareholders ‘equity; 
ROA = return on total assets; 
 
H2 tests whether the level of voluntary disclosure in the Mothers and Jasdaq stock 
markets are different. We used the independent samples T-test method and Wilcoxon 
Test to test the hypothesis.  
H6, H7, H8 test the relation between the level of voluntary disclosure and the size of 
analyst following, accuracy of forecasts and the dispersion of forecasts. We use the 
following regression models to test the last hypotheses.  
 
Model 2-1  
Simultaneous Equation Analysis4 of Forecast Accuracy and Voluntary Disclosure 
                                                  
4 Information disclosure is likely to vary with a number of factors. Consistent with this, 
significant variation disclosure levels are found in empirical studies. (e.g.,Meek, 
Roberts, and Gray, 1995).Thus, it is important to test whether the potential 
endogeneity of disclosures affects the relation between analysts’ forecast accuracy and 
disclosure levels. 
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DSCORE = b0 + b1  ANALYST + b2  MOWN + b3 BLOCK + b4  SHARE
+b5  ROE+ b6 OUTMAN + b7 OUTDIR + b8  AUDITOR
+b9  LISTING+ b10 ACCURACY+ b11 FRSD +
b12 ASSET + b13 ASSETC …. Equation (2) 
 
ACCURACY = b0 + b1  ANALYST + b2  MOWN + b3 BLOCK +
b4 DSCORE + b5 AUDITOR + b6  OUTMAN +
b7 OUTDIR+ b8 ASSET + b9  LISTING+ b10 SALESC   …. Equation (1) 
 
We also use the ordinary regression model (Model2-2) to test the relation between the 
level of voluntary disclosure and the firm’s size, profitability, and leverage, analyst 
following, dispersion of forecast, etc (exclude the variable ACCURACY used in 3SLS 
models). 
 
Model2-2 
DSCORE = b0 + b1  ANALYST + b2  MOWN + b3 BLOCK +
b4 ROE + b5 AUDITOR + b6  OUTMAN + b7 OUTDIR +
b8 ASSET + b9 LISTING + b10  ASSETC + b11 SHARE +
b12 FRSD  
 Where, 
DSCORE= disclosure scores; 
ACCURACY=the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts for the firm. 
FPSD= the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts for the firm. 
ANALYST= Number of analysts following the firm 
MOWN =percentage of equity ownership by CEO and inside directors; 
BLOCK=percentage of equity ownership by substantial shareholders (with equity of 
5% or more) 
SHARE= number of total shareholders following the firm; 
ROE= return on shareholders’ equity; 
OUTMAN= percentage of outside executive directors on the board; 
OUTDIR =percentage of outside auditors on the board; 
AUDITOR=dummy variable for auditor reputation, coded as 1 for Big-Four Auditor 
Firms and 0 otherwise;  
LISTING=dummy variable for listing status, coded as 1 for Jasdaq and 0 for Mothers; 
ASSET= market value of firm; 
SALESC= measured change in sales over the previous year; 
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5 Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics for H1~H5 
Table 1 Panel A provides descriptive statistics of the 100 sample firms in this study. 
The mean of the voluntary disclosure index is 22.97 out of a possible 95, suggesting a 
low voluntary disclosure environment in Mothers and Jasdaq. The highest disclosure 
score obtained is 46, and the lowest is 7. The mean strategic voluntary disclosure is 
6.79, the Mean nonfinancial voluntary disclosure is 6.39, and the mean financial 
disclosure is 9.79. Thus, on average, there is greater disclosure on financial 
performance, and less disclosure on nonfinancial categories. The level of block-holder 
ownership (BLOCK) is high with a mean of 50.2%. We also find the high level of 
outside-auditor (65%) surprising.  
Table 1 PanelB provides descriptive statistics of the firms listed on Mothers. Panel C 
provides descriptive statistics of the firms listed on Jasdaq. For the Mothers 
corporations, the voluntary mean disclosure varied from 6.14 in strategy information to 
4.88 for nonfinancial information, with 8.40 in financial information. The overall mean 
voluntary disclosure was 19.42. However for the Jasdaq corporations, the voluntary 
mean disclosure varied from 7.44 in strategy information to 7.90 for nonfinancial 
information, with 11.18 in financial information. The overall mean voluntary disclosure 
is 26.52. This shows that, the levels of nonfinancial information disclosure for Mothers 
and Jasdaq corporations were relatively lower. Table 1 also reveals that the Mothers 
corporations were larger, on average, in sales change (SALESC) and asset change 
(ASSETC) than the corporations listed on Jasdaq. We find that the mean of sales 
change (SALESC) is 61.7% and the mean of asset change (ASSETC) is 60.6% in the 
Mothers corporations. For the Jasdaq corporations they are 10.8% and 15.16%. This 
means that corporations listed on Mothers achieved higher growth than those listed on 
Jasdaq. Although the firms listed on Mothers achieved higher growth, they did not do 
well in profitability. The mean return on equity (ROE) for Mothers is 1%, and the 
return on equity (ROE) for Jasdaq is 2.5%. Table 1 also shows that both the market’s 
corporations had high levels of leverage (DEBT). As is reflected in Table 1, we find 
firms listed on Jasdaq were larger than those listed on Mothers. 
Panel D provides descriptive statistics of firms by industry type. Panel D shows that 
the level of voluntary disclosure was lowest in the IT industry (mean: 21.45), and, 
highest in Service Industries (mean: 24.95). We also find relatively smaller firms in the 
IT and Electric Machinery industry.  
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5.2 Multivariate tests for H1~H5 
Table 2-1 provides the results of an independent-samples T-test for differences in 
disclosure between Mothers and Jasdaq. Table 2-2 shows the results of a Wilcoxon Test. 
It was found that the level of voluntary disclosure in Mothers stock is lower than in 
Jasdaq. The test also reveals that there are differences in all of strategy, nonfinancial, 
and financial disclosure. Firms listed on Jasdaq disclose more voluntary information 
overall.  
 Table 3 presents the correlation between variables. Disclosure score (DSCORE) is 
positively correlated with ASSET, sales change (SALES), shareholders (SHARE), and 
negatively correlated with managerial ownership (MOWN). The univariate relation 
supports H3, that managerial ownership (MOWN) is negatively correlated with the 
level of voluntary disclosure.  
 Table 4 presents regression results for all the firms with four models. In model 1-1, we 
used ASSET, asset change (ASSETC), and return on equity (ROE) to measure firm size, 
growth, and profitability. In Model1-2 we replace the explanatory variable return on 
equity (ROE) by return on asset (ROA). The results differ from Model 1-1 in 
profitability. In Model1-1, the coefficient of return on equity (ROE) is significant at the 
5% level; however in model1-2, the coefficient of return on asset (ROA) is not 
significant at the 5% level.  Model 1-3 replaces ASSET with SALES and asset change 
(ASSETC) with sales change (SALESC). Model1-4 replaces return on asset (ROA) with 
return on equity (ROE). In Model 1-3, and Model 1-4, we find that the coefficient of 
shareholders (SHARE) is significant, and profitability is not significant. Because Model 
1-1 is the best fitting model and most of the prior studies in voluntary disclosure used 
ASSET and return on equity (ROE) as explanatory variables to measure firm size and 
profitability, in this study, we used ASSET, asset change (ASSETC), and return on 
equity (ROE) as independent variables. 
The use of a regression model is based on the assumptions of no significant 
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables, and conditions of linearity and 
normality. Potential problems related to multicollinearity may be investigated by 
means of a correlation matrix5. The Pearson correlations (see Table3) suggested that 
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables was most unlikely to cause a 
serious problem in the interpretation of the results of the multivariate analysis.  
                                                  
5 To evaluate whether multicollinearity also used the method of variance inflation 
factor(VIF) scores Lardaro(1993) suggests that multicollinearity is unlikely to cause a 
serious problem if VIF scores are less than 10, and none of the VIF scores exceed this 
number. 
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Model 1-1 reported the F value of 7.175 (significant at the .000 level) for all firms 
listed on Mothers and Jasdaq. The adjusted coefficient of determination ( 2R ) for the 
level of overall disclosure is 48.3%. Both of these values suggest that the model 
explains variation fairly well. The regression coefficient for LISTING (4.077) is positive 
and statistically significant (p<0.01), suggesting that firms listed on Jasdaq disclose 
more voluntary information. The coefficient for ASSET (.000) is positively correlated 
with disclosure scores (DSCORE) and significant (p<0.01), the standardized coefficient 
for ASSET is .591, suggesting that firm size is the most explanatory variable in this 
model. The coefficient on return on equity (ROE) (5.184) is significantly positive 
(p<0.05).  
 Table 5, Panel A provided the regression results in Mothers, and Panel B provided the 
regression results in Jasdaq. As shown in Panel A, the F value was 3.523 (significant at 
the .001 level). The adjusted coefficient of determination was 41.9%. 
 Similarly, the F value in Panel C was 3.634 (significant at the .001 level). The 
adjusted coefficient of determination was 42.9%. 
  Table 6 shows regression results for models using three voluntary disclosure 
subgroups as dependent variables. Table 6 Panel A shows the results with Strategic 
Disclosure scores as a dependent variable in Mothers and Jasdaq stock market; Panel 
B shows the results with Nonfinancial Disclosure scores as a dependent variable in 
Mothers and Jasdaq stock market; Panel C shows the results of Financial Disclosure 
scores as dependent variable in Mothers and Jasdaq. There were some differences in 
the explanatory power of the information types in both markets. The coefficient of 
determination in disclosure for Mothers firms ranged from 8% ( 2R  Panel A-1) for 
strategic information (not significant), to 33% ( 2R  Panel B-1) for nonfinancial 
information (significant at the .01 level), with financial information at 20% ( 2R  Panel 
C-1) (significant at the 0.1 level). On the other hand, the amount of explained variation 
in disclosure for Jasdaq firms ranged from 8% ( 2R  Panel C-2) for financial information 
(not significant), to 53%( 2R  PanelA-2) for strategy information (significant at the .000 
level), with nonfinancial information at 44% ( 2R  Panel B-2) (significant at the .001 
level). 
 
5.2.1 Mothers 
As shown in Table 5 and Table 6, the coefficient ASSET of Mothers firms was highly 
significant (p<0.001), not only for total information (Table 5 Panel A) but also for 
nonfinancial information (Table 6 Panel B-1) and financial information (Table6 Panel 
C-1). The coefficient of leverage (DEBT) was negative and significant (p<0.1 Table 5 
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Panel A) for total information. The coefficient for service industry (INDUSTRY2) of 
firms listed on Mothers was significant (p< .05) for total information (p=. 002 Table 5 
Panel A), nonfinancial information (p=. 022 Table 6 Panel B-1), and financial 
information (p=. 002 Table 6 Panel C-1). This indicates that Service Industries in 
Mothers disclose more information. We also find that electric machines industry 
(INDUSTRY3) was significant (p< .05) for total disclosure scores (p=. 013 Table 5 Panel 
A), and financial disclosure (p=. 012 Table 6 Panel C-1). In the Mothers market, we 
could not find return on equity (ROE) significantly correlated with the level of 
voluntary disclosure. However the result shows that profitability is positively 
correlated with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
We find that outside ownership of Mothers firms is negatively correlated with the 
level of voluntary disclosure (Table 5 Panel A). The results show that higher outside 
ownership does not increase the level of information disclosure in Mothers markets.  
The results show that the coefficient on shareholders (SHARE) is negative and 
significant (p< .05 Table 5 Panel A), and it is also significantly correlated with the level 
of financial disclosure (p< .05 Table6 Panel C-1). We also find that managerial 
ownership (MOWN) is positively correlated with voluntary disclosure level, although it 
is not significant (Table 5 Panel A). Block-holder ownership (BLOCK) is negatively 
correlated with the level of voluntary disclosure, and Foreign shareholders (FOREIGN), 
asset change (ASSETC) was positively correlated with the level of voluntary disclosure, 
although this are not significant either (Table 5 Panel A).  
  To summarize the results: ①  The level of voluntary disclosure is positively 
correlated with firm size both in Mothers. This is consistent with the results in Meek, 
and Gray (1995), and Cooke (1991), Mark (2003). ② The level of voluntary disclosure 
is not related to profitability in Mothers. This result is converse to the results in Gray 
(1995), Jaggi (2000) ③ The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively correlated with 
the number of shareholders.  
 
5.2.2 Jasdaq 
As shown in Table 5 and Table 6, the coefficient for ASSET of Jasdaq firms was 
significantly correlated (p=0.07 Table5 Panel B) with the level of disclosure. The 
coefficient on return on equity (ROE) is positive and significant (p=0.07 Table 5 Panel 
B) for total information. The coefficient for managerial ownership (MOWN) of firms 
listed on Jasdaq was negative and significantly (p=0.08 Table 5 Panel B) correlated 
with the level of voluntary disclosure.  
We find that the outside ownership structure is negatively correlated with the level 
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of voluntary disclosure not only in the Mothers market but also in the Jasdaq market. 
The results show that higher outside ownership does not increase the level of 
information disclosure in the two markets.  
It also shows the coefficient on shareholders (SHARE) was positive and significant 
(p< .05 Table 5 Panel B) with total information, and also significantly in strategic 
information (p=. 061 Table 6 Panel A-2) and nonfinancial information (p=. 081 Table 6 
Panel B-2). We also find that leverage (DEBT), and foreigner shareholders (FOREIGN) 
were positively correlated with the level of voluntary disclosure, and block-holder 
ownership (BLOCK), and asset change (ASSETC) were negatively correlated with the 
level of voluntary disclosure, although they are not significant (Table 5 Panel B).  
To summarize the results:  ①  The level of voluntary disclosure is positively 
correlated with firm size in Jasdaq. This is consistent with the results in Meek, and 
Gray (1995), and Cooke (1991), Mark (2003). ② The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively correlated with profitability in Jasdaq. This result is consistent with the 
results in Srinivasan (2004), Gray (1995), and Jaggi (2000). ③ The level of voluntary 
disclosure is positively correlated with the number of shareholders. ④ The level of 
voluntary disclosure is higher in Jasdaq than in Mothers. 
 
  
5.3 Descriptive statistics for H6~H8 
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics of 32 sample firms in this study (The sample 
with data available from IBES, 22 firms listed on Jasdaq). The mean of the voluntary 
disclosure index is 25.53 out of a possible 95. The mean of the number of analysts 
following was 10.16. The average of accuracy of forecast was -0.08, and the lowest 
accuracy was -0.87 in this sample. Table 7 also shows that the mean of dispersion of 
forecast (FRSD) was 0.06, the largest dispersion was 0.66. 
 Table 8 presents the correlation between variables. Disclosure score (DSCORE) is 
positively correlated with the size of analyst following (ANALYST), and ASSET. 
Forecast accuracy (ACCURACY) is positively correlated with asset change (ASSETC), 
return on equity (ROE) and dispersion of forecast (FRSD). 
 
5.4 Multivariate tests for H6~H8 
Table 9 provides the results of Model 2-2. Model 2-2 tests the relation between the level 
of voluntary disclosure and the firm size, profitability, leverage, analyst following, and 
dispersion of forecast, excluding the variable ACCURACY used in 3SLS models. 
It shows that the coefficient for the analyst following of sample firms is significant 
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(p< .05) and positive. It suggests that more additional information disclosures attract 
more analysts. The result is consistent with the results in Li.Li.Eng (1999, 2000). We 
also find that firm size (ASSET) is positive and significant (p< .01). However we could 
not find that LISTING is significant and positive. This shows that the levels of 
voluntary disclosure are not different between Mothers and Jasdaq. Contrary to our 
expectation, dispersion of forecast (FRSD) was associated with voluntary disclosures.  
Table 10 reports the results of three-stage least squares (3SLS) analysis. In model2, 
both voluntary disclosure scores (DSCORE) and sales change (SALESC) are positively 
associated with forecast accuracy at less than the 5% level, supporting the H6: 
accuracy is positively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. It also shows 
that more analysts following decrease the forecast accuracy. It is not surprising that 
the level of voluntary disclosure is strongly and positively associated with the number 
of analysts. The adjusted coefficient of determination ( 2R ) for Model 2-1 equations (2) 
is 11%, thus it has weak explanatory power. The objective of Model 2-1 is to understand 
factors influencing the forecast accuracy, and the total system weighted R-square was 
69%. The result about the association between forecast and the level of voluntary 
disclosure is consistent with the observation in Srinivasan (2004). Although Srinivasan 
documents that more analysts following will increase the forecast accuracy, our result 
shows a converse observation. 
The following table shows our predictions about coefficients of regression analysis. 
 
Dep(DSCORE)ASSET ASSETC ROE DEBT MOWN BLOCK SHARE FOREIGN
Pre. + + + + - - + +
All firms Est. + + + - - - + +
Mothers Est. + + + - + - - +
Jasdaq Est. + - + + - - + +
Continued
Dep(DSCORE)OUTMANOUTDIR AUDITORINDUSTRY1INDUSTRY2INDUSTRY3ANALYSTFRSD
Pre. + + + ? ? ? ? ?
All firms Est. - + - - + + + +
Mothers Est. - - - + + + * *
Jasdaq Est. - - - - - - * *  
 
 From the table, we can see that most of our predictions are consistent with our results. 
However, the results show that most outside ownership is negatively correlated with 
information disclosure. The result contradicts our predictions. The table also shows 
that ROE is positively correlated with all firms listed on Mothers and Jasdaq, although 
it is not significantly correlated with information disclosure in corporations listed on 
Mothers. The number of shareholders (SHARE) is negatively correlated with the level 
of information disclosure in corporations listed on Mothers. Managerial ownership 
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(MOWN) also shows a negative relation to information disclosure in Mothers. All of 
this might be explained by the fact that the Mothers market is younger than the 
Jasdaq market, and the Mothers market needs stronger enforcement to increase 
information disclosure level. The other reason might be that the listing requirement of 
Mothers is less rigorous than Jasdaq’s.  
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this study we investigate the factors influencing the level of voluntary disclosure, 
and also examine the effects of variables on forecast accuracy in both the Mothers and 
the Jasdaq stock markets. We document that firm size, market listing, profitability, 
and analysts following are associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. We find 
that most of the results are consistent with the results in prior research. We also find 
that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with forecast accuracy, 
which suggests that voluntary disclosures provide useful information to analysts. The 
result is consistent with the results in Srinivasan (2004) and Li.Li.Eng (1999).  
We also discover that increased analyst following will decrease forecast accuracy. We 
find that sales change is positively associated with forecast accuracy. One plausible 
reason is that better performing firms are inclined to disclose more information which 
in turn in increases forecast accuracy. Examining the relation between disclosure and 
managerial ownership (MOWN), we document that the level of voluntary disclosure is 
negatively correlated with managerial ownership (MOWN) in Jasdaq, a result which is 
consistent with the results in Mark (2003), and Gray (2002). We further document that 
the level of voluntary disclosure is positively correlated with the number of 
shareholders (SHARE) in Jasdaq. However managerial ownership (MOWN) is not 
related to the level of voluntary disclosure and the number of shareholders (SHARE) is 
negatively correlated with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
  One of our interests is to understand outside directors’ roles in corporations listed on 
the Mothers and Jasdaq markets. To increase the transparency, and enhance 
monitoring, the Japan Stock Exchange encourages firms to increase the number of 
independent directors. Auditor firm is also mandated. However, our results cast doubt 
on the effect. Our findings suggest that outside directors and big-auditor firms did not 
effectively increase the level of voluntary disclosure. Our results are different from the 
results in prior research such as Jaggi (2000) and Gray (2002).  
 It might be necessary for shareholders to increase the pressure on companies listed on 
Mothers and Jasdaq to achieve better disclosure. Even for large Japanese corporations, 
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greater disclosure and relevant regulation are desirable in order to avoid corporate 
scandals such as the disclosure irregularities in Seibu Railway. 
 In Japan, the disclosure system is becoming more and more important. First, Japan is 
adopting global accounting standards; second, Japan is moving from a bank-centered 
system to a capital market-based system and from a system with concentrated investor 
ownership to a system with more dispersed investors; and third, Japan is 
comprehensively overhauling its legal and regulatory infrastructure of the capital 
market. In recent years, the Japan Stock Exchange and the other regulatory 
authorities have made some changes in the information disclosure rules, standards and 
guideline affecting corporate governance practice and financial reporting practice. In 
future research, we should be examining how the change of rules affects voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
 
